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Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.*
OR students of constitutional interpretation, Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida1 and Alden v. Maine,2 two of the Court's most
important recent Eleventh Amendment opinions, are gold mines.
Each is a monumental opinion with lengthy and spirited debate between
the majority and the dissents. Every significant method of constitutional
interpretation (including textualism, original understanding, structure,
precedent, doctrine, practice, and rhetoric) is employed by both the ma-
jorities and the dissents. Both the majorities and the dissents are able to
advance solid and respectable arguments in favor of their positions. Ar-
guably, these two cases could be used as texts for the study of virtually all
of constitutional interpretation. Rather than attempting that however, I
would like to focus on and analyze several discrete interpretive issues
presented in these cases. I will concentrate primarily on Seminole, but I
will also discuss Alden, especially where similar interpretive issues or ar-
guments are raised.
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, SEMINOLE AND ALDEN
At the outset, it is necessary to provide sufficient background to place
the interpretive issues in context. Article III of the Constitution provides,
in part, that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a
State and Citizens of another State."'3 In one of its first significant opin-
ions, Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court read Article III literally
and concluded that a federal court did have jurisdiction over a suit
against a state by a citizen of another state to enforce a debt against the
state.4 The Eleventh Amendment was drafted and ratified in great haste
to overrule Chisholm. The amendment, which on its face addresses the
type of fact situation before the Court in Chisholm, states that "[t]he Ju-
dicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any For-
* Professor of Law Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. B.A.
SMU 1970; J.D. University of Michigan 1973.
1. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
3. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4. 2 U.S. 419, 479 (1793).
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eign State." 5 Nearly one hundred years later, in Hans v. Louisiana, the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not create a new immunity
from suit against states by citizens of other states but merely recognized
that, prior to and as of the ratification of the Constitution, unconsenting
states were immune from suit by citizens of any state including their
own.6 Consequently, the principles recognized by the Eleventh Amend-
ment transcended its narrow language and prohibited a suit against a
state by its own citizens, even if based on federal question jurisdiction.
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, a 1996 five to four decision,
Justice Rehnquist's opinion held that Congress did not have the power
under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate state immunity from suit
in federal court.7 In a lengthy opinion, the Court concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment recognized the "basic postulate" that sovereign
immunity shields states from suits by citizens in federal court. Since this
protection is of a constitutional stature, Congress may not abrogate it leg-
islatively under any Article I power.8 Justice Stevens dissented, arguing
that existing precedent recognizes that the Eleventh Amendment creates
only a presumption of sovereign immunity, which Congress has the power
to abrogate.9 In a lengthy and detailed dissent joined by Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer, Justice Souter argued that the Eleventh Amendment
provided immunity only against suits based on diversity of citizenship and
that any sovereign immunity held by the states in federal suits was attrib-
utable to common law rather than the Constitution, thus such immunity
could readily be abrogated by Congress. 10
Three years later in Alden v. Maine, another five-to-four decision with
the same split among the Justices, the Court held that the Congress could
not, pursuant to its Article I powers, abrogate the immunity of states
from suit by citizens in state court pursuant to a federal cause of action.
Writing for the majority and relying on original understanding, precedent
and, most significantly, constitutional structure, Justice Kennedy con-
cluded that state sovereign immunity whether in federal or state court,
was and has been a crucial aspect of the sovereignty retained by the states
from the very outset. 12 In the process, Justice Kennedy shifted the justifi-
cation away from the Eleventh Amendment, which he viewed as merely
recognizing the existence of the "essential postulates" of state sovereignty
in a very specific context, to the Tenth Amendment, which protects them
in a more comprehensive manner.13 As in Seminole, Justice Souter's
lengthy dissent took issue with the Court on virtually every point and
maintained that sovereign immunity was not as well accepted at the fram-
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
6. 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890).
7. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
8. Id. at 72-73.
9. Id. at 76-77.
10. Id. at 100.
11. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
12. Id. at 713.
13. Id. at 713-14.
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ing as the majority believed. 14 Justice Souter argued that the very con-
cept of sovereign immunity is largely inconsistent with the nature of
popular government, especially with regard to federally based causes of
action against state governments. 5 Ultimately, Justice Souter and the
three justices who joined his dissent expressed a very different conception
of constitutional structure than did Justice Kennedy for the majority.
With this summary, I will devote the remainder of this paper to short
examinations of several interesting interpretative issues raised in Semi-
nole and Alden.
II. TEXTUALISM-DOES THE TEXT TAKE PRECEDENCE?
Most students of constitutional interpretation would agree that the text
is at least the place to start when attempting to discern constitutional
meaning. 16 Some would insist that, if the text is relatively clear, it should
take precedence over any alternative meaning suggested by other inter-
pretive methods. 17 The Eleventh Amendment cases are one of the most
stunning examples, however, of other methodologies trumping the text.
By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal court suits
against a state by out-of-state citizens. In Hans v. Louisiana, however,
the Court extended the immunity to suits by a state's own citizens against
the state.' 8 The majority in Seminole and Alden continued to endorse
this reading and, moreover, in Alden the Court extended the immunity to
suits based on federal causes of action in state courts as well, seemingly
violating the text both with respect to the class of plaintiffs and the fo-
rums covered. In his dissent in Seminole, Justice Souter charged that the
majority was making no serious attempt to construe the text.19 He ar-
gued there were two straightforward readings of the text to choose from,
although neither supported the Court's result.20 Arguably, the amend-
ment was designed to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over suits
based on diversity of citizenship.21 Justice Souter argued this reading is
bolstered by the Eleventh Amendment's precise tracking of Article III
language. 22 In Seminole, Justice Rehnquist conceded that the text seems
to support this reading. 23 Alternatively, Justice Souter noted that the text
could be read as prohibiting any suit against a state by an out-of-state
citizen in federal court, whether based on diversity or on federal question
14. Id. at 714.
15. Id. at 759, 762-94, 796-802.
16. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 747 (1999).
17. See SCALIA, supra note 16, at 37-47.
18. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
19. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 110, 115, 119.
20. Id. at 110.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 110-111.
23. Id. at 54.
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jurisdiction.24 Neither reading supports the results in Seminole or Alden.
The Court in Seminole was hardly the first to conclude that the Elev-
enth Amendment should not be read literally. That approach dates to
Hans and has been followed for one hundred years. Thus, the question
presented is not whether a plain reading of the text may be trumped by
other interpretive methods, but rather, whether the text should be given
such primacy that a correct reading of the text (assuming for sake of argu-
ment that one of Justice Souter's suggested readings is correct) should
override a century of precedent to the contrary. This presents a value
choice with respect to the respective weight of two different but impor-
tant methods of interpretation.
One might expect a strong textualist, such as Justice Scalia, to prefer
the text to precedent in all but the most extreme cases. On the other
hand, a Justice who believes strongly in precedent and stare decisis would
be hard-pressed to reject a reading as well established and as heavily re-
lied on as Hans, no matter how inconsistent with the best reading of the
text. These cases present one of the most serious challenges in all of con-
stitutional law to the preeminence of textualism. These cases are particu-
larly notable since it might seem that the Justices in the majority,
especially Justice Scalia, would generally be most receptive to a strong
textualist approach. However, these Justices do have a response. The
majority did not ultimately agree that Hans misinterpreted the text. In-
stead, it argued that the text of the Eleventh Amendment, like any consti-
tutional text, must be read and understood in historical context.2 5 In
other words, the proper reading of the text, as Justice Scalia would no
doubt argue, is the text as it was originally understood. 26 Using this ap-
proach, the majority argued that the framing generation understood the
states to be sovereign entities protected by sovereign immunity against
citizen suits. 27 The Court in Chisholm v. Georgia,28 misunderstood this
and was immediately rebuked by passage of the Eleventh Amendment.
29
Since the original understanding was one of near-complete sovereign im-
munity, there was little need to assert this but rather simply repeal the
holding of Chisholm on its facts.30 In Alden, Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, pointed out that the Eleventh Amendment does not purport
to erect an immunity against suits as such, but instead states that the judi-
cial power shall not be "construed" to reach suits like the one brought in
Chisholm.31 Consequently, the amendment by its terms addressed misin-
terpretation of the prior understanding.32 So the Court's response to Jus-
24. Id. at 110.
25. Id. at 68.
26. SCALIA, supra note 16, at 37-47.
27. Seminole, 517 U. S. at 68.
28. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
29. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 69.
30. Id. at 69-70.




tice Souter's plain-meaning approach is to argue that the meaning is not
at all plain when read in proper historical context.
III. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
A. How MUCH PROOF OF ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING IS ENOUGH?
In his dissenting opinions in Seminole and Alden, Justice Souter argued
that, just as the Court misunderstood or ignored the plain text, it also
misunderstood the original understanding or context. Contrary to the
Court's conclusion that the sovereign immunity of the states was over-
whelmingly accepted by the framing generation, that it was an "essential
postulate," as the Court has put it, in fact sovereign immunity was a con-
troversial concept by no means universally accepted at the time.33 In Al-
den, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in turn, replied that the
Court's showing of support for sovereign immunity at the time of the
framing of the Constitution was far stronger than Justice Souter's proof to
the contrary. 34 Assuming that this was true, as it appears to be, the ques-
tion then becomes to what extent should proof of conflicting views of the
original understanding undermine reliance on such an understanding. It
is given that history will rarely, if ever, be clear and undisputed. If we
demand certainty, we will almost never be able to establish the original
understanding with respect to any constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, a solid showing should suffice, even if there is some evi-
dence to the contrary. But there may be reason for a higher burden of
proof here. Arguably, the majority is not simply attempting to employ
original understanding to define the meaning of the plain text but rather
to contradict the plain meaning of the text, or at least to employ historical
context to support a meaning that would otherwise be far from obvious.
Consequently, Justice Souter argued that the proof of significant dispute
as to the status of sovereign immunity destroys any claim that it was, in
fact, an unstated essential postulate.35 There is certainly some logic be-
hind this argument. The recognition of "essential postulates," arguably in
tension with the text itself, should require a fairly compelling showing.
Even so, the majority may nevertheless have satisfied that heavy burden,
although the dissent, as well as the historians it relies upon, may disagree.
B. DOES PRECEDENT DETERMINE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING?
Just as the majority in Seminole relied heavily on precedent to deflect
Justice Souter's textual argument, it further relied, to a certain extent, on
precedent to bolster its views on the original understanding. The major-
ity, especially in Alden, provided a fair amount of historical support for
its claim that the framing generation considered state sovereign immunity
from citizen suits in federal court to be an essential postulate of the sys-
33. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 131-59; Alden, 517 U.S. at 764-81.
34. Alden, 527 U.S. at 724.
35. Alden, 527 U.S. at 778-79, 789, 794; Seminole, 517 U.S. at 139, 149.
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tern created by the constitution. 36 However, in response to Justice Sou-
ter's argument to the contrary, the Court in Seminole and Alden also
relied on precedent, declaring that position was adopted by the Court
over one hundred years earlier in Hans, and it is too late in the day to
reopen the question.37 Justice Souter responded that the original under-
standing is a matter of history, which simply can't be resolved by prior
judicial decisions.38 If subsequent historians make the case that the
Court's earlier historical conclusions are incorrect, the Court should pay
attention, and if need be, correct its errors. Justice Souter is certainly
correct: the Supreme Court doesn't and can't have the last word on his-
tory. Historians will always continue to discover, revise, synthesize, and
correct. The Court, however, is not attempting to have the final say on
history but rather the final say on constitutional meaning, which of
course, may heavily be influenced by history. Getting it right is important
to the judicial process, but so is certainty and stability.39 Stare decisis
assumes that courts will make mistakes but that many of those mistakes
are best left uncorrected. This should generally be true of historical inter-
pretation as well as other forms of legal interpretation.
Presumably, some interpretations are so well settled or deeply en-
trenched that the court would not reverse them even if it were shown that
they were based on clear historical error.40 Whereas in the Eleventh
Amendment area the Court still can marshal strong historical evidence in
support of its position, the existence of conflicting evidence, even if sup-
ported by a significant portion of contemporary historians, should not
necessarily cause the Court to revisit its earlier conclusions. The Court is
not a participant in an on-going historical seminar. Justice Souter is cor-
rect that prior Supreme Court precedent is not a primary source of his-
tory, but it often must be the Court's primary source.
IV. PRECEDENT
A. How DOES THE COURT DISTINGUISH DICTA FROM THE HOLDING
OF A PRIOR CASE?
Perhaps no question is closer to the heart of common law adjudication,
as well as the use of precedent in constitutional law, as the ability to dis-
tinguish dicta from the holding of a case, and yet, it is a question on which
there continues to be some disagreement. Seminole finds the majority
36. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-27. See also Seminole, 517 U.S. at 722-26.
37. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 54: Alden, 527 U.S. at 745-48.
38. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 107 n.5; Alden, 527 U.S. at 770 n.8.
39. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 408 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring).
40. For instance the court would not reverse Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), even if it were conclusively shown that the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not prohibit segregated schools. Likewise, the court would not
reject the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the legitimacy of substantive due process
analysis or a relatively expansive reading of the Establishment Clause even if it could be
shown conclusively that each of these is contrary to the correct original understanding.
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and Justice Souter disputing what the holding was and what constituted
mere dicta in Hans and subsequent Eleventh Amendment cases, specifi-
cally on the issue of whether the sovereign immunity recognized by the
Eleventh Amendment is of constitutional or merely common law origin
and stature. The majority cited language from several cases, most promi-
nently Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,41 explaining that the sover-
eign immunity in question is a constitutional limitation on Article III
jurisdiction.42 Justice Souter responded that this language is mere dicta
since the Court was not faced with the question of whether Congress
could abrogate the immunity and consequently, it didn't matter whether
it was of constitutional or common law origin.43 The majority responded
by citing several cases for the proposition that "[w]hen an opinion issues
for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opin-
ion necessary to that result by which we are bound. '44 Justice Souter did
not offer a competing principle for distinguishing holding from dicta. He
could argue, however, that even under the majority's definition, the state-
ments in question were dicta since the cases could have come out the
same way even if the sovereign immunity in question was not constitu-
tionally based. The majority might have responded by contending that
the stated rationale of a case is to be taken seriously by subsequent courts
even if it is not absolutely essential to the result, since it is presumably the
justification upon which the prior court relied in reaching its decision. In
other words, even if common law sovereign immunity may have lead to
the same result, it is not irrelevant that prior courts clearly believed that
they were relying on a constitutionally-based doctrine. It is quite possible
that they would not have reached the same result on the basis of non-
constitutionally grounded sovereign immunity even if they could have.
The Court in Seminole quotes language from concurring opinions of Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor that supports this approach.45
Justice Souter's primary argument in favor of the common law basis for
sovereign immunity is that the holdings of several other lines of cases
establish that, in the past, the Court itself has not taken seriously the
language that the Seminole majority relied on so heavily. Thus, he argued
that the Court would not have held that states could consent to federal
jurisdiction in citizen suits if there was a complete constitutional bar
against such jurisdiction. 46 Likewise, he noted that the Supreme Court
could not hear appeals from federal question suits by citizens in state
courts if sovereign immunity were a flat out constitutional prohibition.47
Finally, he stated that the Court wouldn't have suggested that Congress
41. 292 U.S. 313, 321-23 (1934).
42. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 67; Alden, 527 U.S. at 727.
43. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 123-27.
44. Id. at 67.
45. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) and Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 490 (1986) (O'Connor, J,
concurring)).
46. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 126-28.
47. Id. at 128.
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could abrogate sovereign immunity with a clear statement if, in fact, it
was prohibited by constitutionally-based sovereign immunity.48 These
are powerful arguments, but there are answers to each of these points.
With respect to consent, it is not obvious why a state couldn't consent
to a suit even if the bar is constitutional. Indeed, even if it is considered
jurisdictional, there is no reason why the prohibition could not be waived
given that the point of the immunity was to protect the state. As for
Supreme Court review of state court suits, the Court has long distin-
guished these on the grounds that they are appeals and not suits and
hence are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 49 Justice Souter finds
this distinction unsatisfactory,50 and perhaps it is, especially since the
scope of the immunity extends well beyond the precise terms of the Elev-
enth Amendment. Still, it is a distinction long embedded in the case law.
The Congressional abrogation cases seem inconsistent with the Court's
present theory; however, they could simply be examples of the Court
avoiding the constitutional issue in favor of a statutory alternative. In
other words, the Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that Congress
could abrogate immunity in cases where it hadn't done so, rather than
definitively conclude that it couldn't until the issue could no longer be
avoided. These cases may have sent out the wrong message creating false
hopes in Congress but, even so, they still could be considered typical ex-
amples of the avoidance of constitutional issues where non-constitutional
grounds exist.
Seminole illustrates the difficulty of employing the holding/dicta dis-
tinction. The majority has strong language in support of its holding,
which may not have been essential to earlier holdings but was probably at
least well considered and important. Justice Souter has a variety of argu-
ments as to why this language should not be taken at face value. On
balance, I believe that the majority survives Justice Souter's attack on this
point, but just barely. In any event, the case provides a sharp example of
the degree to which the dicta and holding are flexible conceptions.
B. WHEN SHOULD PRECEDENT BE OVERRULED?
Seminole also addressed the significant and recurring issue of when a
precedent be should overruled. The Seminole5' Court did overrule the
Court's previous decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.52 That case
held that Congress could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity against a
citizen suit in a federal court under the interstate commerce clause.
53
Seminole presented the question of whether Congress could also abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. Since the
48. Id. at 128-29.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 66.
52. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
53. Id. at 19-20.
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Court readily concluded that the Indian Commerce and Interstate Com-
merce Clauses were indistinguishable for purposes of abrogation, it
needed to consider whether Union Gas should be followed or
abandoned.
54
In concluding that Union Gas should be overruled, the Court relied on
several factors. It began by noting that, while constitutional precedent
should generally be followed, there should be some room for reconsidera-
tion given that correction of errors in constitutional cases by legislation
was nearly impossible. 55 The Court then noted that one recognized
ground for overruling was where a precedent had proved to be unwork-
able.5 6 It maintained that this was such a case as only four Justices had
joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Union Gas, with Justice
White adding the fifth vote for the holding but explicitly dissenting from
the rationale.57 That, of course, created confusion as to the meaning and
application of the case, and the Court pointed out that such confusion has
been reflected in subsequent lower court opinions.58 A second considera-
tion was the extent to which the rationale of the case in question is consis-
tent with prior law.59 The Court argued that Union Gas "deviated
sharply" from prior precedent by holding that Congress could enlarge the
Court's Article III jurisdiction since the Court had maintained that the
state sovereign immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment was a
limitation of Article III jurisdiction.60 The Court further noted that
Union Gas was a solitary departure from precedent in that the Court had
not relied on it in the five years since it was decided. 61 It also maintained
that Union Gas was poorly reasoned because it clearly misread prior pre-
cedent, especially Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,62 which turned on the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted subsequent to Article I, and thus
could logically be understood as altering it.63 Finally, the Court pointed
out that the dissenters made no attempt to defend Union Gas,64 which
was indeed interesting and unusual considering the Court attacked that
decision with such vigor. There is, however, an obvious explanation.
As noted above, the majority argued that Union Gas was a departure
from the longstanding view, embodied in Hans, that sovereign immunity
as recognized but not created by the Eleventh Amendment, limited the
scope of Article III jurisdiction. The dissents of both Justice Stevens65
and Justice Souter 66 disputed this conclusion at great length. They ar-
54. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 62-63.
55. Id. at 63.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 63-64.
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 66.
62. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
63. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 65-66.
64. Id. at 66.




gued instead that whatever sovereign immunity may exist is of non-con-
stitutional status and thus may be abrogated by Congress and,
consequently, it is the Seminole majority and not Union Gas that is out of
step with longstanding precedent.
Whether the Court was correct in overruling Union Gas turns on who
is correct about the ultimate issue in the case-whether the sovereign
immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment is of a constitutional
nature. If it is, and if the prior case law has so established, then the crite-
ria relied upon by the majority provide a strong argument for overruling.
If not, then Seminole rather than Union Gas should probably be
overruled.
Seminole raises one other issue with respect to overruling of prece-
dent-whether Justice Souter should support the overruling of Hans in
view of his lengthy and vigorous attack on the case. Quite beyond Justice
Souter's argument that the majority in Seminole clearly misunderstood
Hans as holding that the immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amend-
ment is constitutional in nature, he argued that Hans itself was wrongly
decided in that it: failed to understand that the Eleventh Amendment
only repealed citizen state diversity jurisdiction and did not touch federal
question jurisdiction, 67 failed to appreciate the hesitancy of the framing
generation to adopt the common law wholesale, 68 and failed to under-
stand how the concept of sovereignty was radically changed by the adop-
tion of the constitution. 69 Justice Souter elaborated on each of these
errors at great length. Considering that he arguably demonstrated that
Hans was profoundly incorrectly decided in almost every respect, one
might think that overruling would be in order. Justice Souter, however,
rejected that option considering that Hans had been continuously relied
on for better than one hundred years. 70 Instead, he would simply avoid
expanding its holding as he believed the majority had done.7' Justice
Souter's conclusion is a testament to the power of stare decisis in consti-
tutional litigation. Where, unlike Union Gas, a precedent, even if wrongly
decided and heavily criticized, has withstood the test of time for over one
hundred years and has been relied upon in literally thousands of federal
court cases, overruling would simply be too disruptive no matter how
misguided the case might be.
C. CAN PRECEDENT LEGITIMATELY BE EXPLAINED AND DEVALUED
By EXTRA-JUDICIAL SOURCES?
There is one further interesting issue of precedent raised in Seminole.
That is, to what extent may the result in a prior opinion be explained and
devalued by an extra-judicial explanation? Justice Souter questioned
67. Id. at 116-23.
68. Id. at 131-41.
69. Id. at 141-59.




how Hans could have threatened settled constitutional principle by re-
moving the federal forum in which citizens could sue their own states for
violation of federally protected rights.72 He answered that question by
reference to extra-judicial historical material alleging that the Court in
Hans withdrew federal jurisdiction to avoid the humiliation of the inabil-
ity of the federal judiciary to enforce its judgments in southern states fol-
lowing the removal of federal troops at the end of reconstruction. 73 The
majority in turn scolded Justice Souter complaining that "[i]ts undocu-
mented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in
Hans is a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication. '74
Justice Souter, in turn, replied that his point was not to undermine a de-
fensible decision but rather to explain an "utterly indefensible" one.75
He cited speculation in Puerto Rico v. Branstead76 as to the reasons be-
hind the Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison77 as a recent example
of the same approach that had been joined by Justice Rehnquist, the au-
thor of the majority in Seminole, along with two other members of the
majority.78 Whether or not the Court has engaged in such analysis
before, the majority surely had a good point. It would indeed undermine
the very legitimacy of constitutional law and precedent if decisions could
be impeached by extra-judicial conspiratorial-type explanations. Moreo-
ver, it would lead the Court into a morass of historical argument that
would be distracting, complicated, and potentially misleading. The ma-
jority is certainly correct in suggesting that this is a road worth avoiding.
That having been said, however, the point was fairly tangential to Justice
Souter's arguments against Hans, which were based largely on tradition-
ally-respected methods of legal analysis.
V. STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT
Along with text, original understanding, and precedent, constitutional
structure is also considered a legitimate and significant method of consti-
tutional interpretation. There is probably no perfect definition of consti-
tutional structural argument. As I understand it, reliance on
constitutional structure is a means by which constitutional meaning may
be discerned by considering the structure of the text as a whole with an
eye toward understanding the purposes sought to be achieved and the
nature of the government created.79 Justice Marshall's opinion in McCul-
loch v. Maryland80 is often cited as the classic example of structural rea-
72. Id. at 120-21.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 68-69.
75. Id. at 122 n.17.
76. 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
77. 65 U.S. 66 (1860).
78. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 122 n.17.
79. See CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 7 (1969).
80. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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soning.81 The structural method of interpretation often appears in cases
in which the substantive issue also concerns the structure of the constitu-
tion such as separation of powers or federalism. Thus, it is not surprising
that structural arguments loom large in Eleventh Amendment cases since
they raise the most persistent issue of American constitutional law-the
relationship between the states and the national government. Structural
arguments play an important role in Seminole and Alden. The use of
structural arguments in these cases draws attention to two interesting in-
terpretive issues. First, where do structural arguments come from? Or to
put it another way, what is the relationship between structural argument
and other interpretive methodologies? Second, how should the Court
choose between two competing structural arguments?
A. WHERE Do STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS COME FROM?
The Court's primary argument in both Seminole and Alden is structural
in nature although it isn't always identified as such. The Court was able to
shift from the Eleventh to the Tenth Amendment fairly easily from Semi-
nole to Alden because in both cases the basic argument was more struc-
tural than textual. When the Court relied on "essential postulates," it was
basically falling back on constitutional structure. It was saying that there
are large themes apparent in the constitutional structure, in this instance
a high degree of state sovereignty with respect to citizen suits, which must
be taken seriously even if not specifically embodied in the text. The ques-
tion then becomes how does the Court or any other constitutional inter-
preter know that this is so. In its purest form, a structural argument or
understanding might be derived simply from reading the full text and
contemplating its purpose. The argument might be derived in the ab-
stract. Generally, however, the Court will look to other sources as well,
to discern or at least validate arguments of constitutional structure. That
seems to have been the case in Seminole and Alden. In Seminole, Justice
Rehnquist relied on precedent, specifically Principality of Monaco v. Mis-
sissippi, for the proposition that there are "essential postulates" behind
the constitution including the primacy of state sovereignty. 82 That does
not mean that his ultimate argument is one of precedent rather than
structure, but rather, that an earlier Court had made the structural argu-
ment first.
Since Justice Kennedy relied on structural argument more explicitly
and in much greater detail in Alden than Justice Rehnquist did in Semi-
nole, I will concentrate primarily on the former case. Writing for the
Court, Justice Kennedy made it clear time and again that constitutional
structure is central to his thesis that the States continue to enjoy constitu-
tionally-based sovereign immunity against suits by citizens in federal, and
in some circumstances, state courts as well. At the very outset of his
opinion, he noted that:
81. BLACK, supra note 79, at 13.
82. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 68.
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[A]s the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative in-
terpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States en-
joyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they re-
tain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the
Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered
by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amend-
ments.8
3
Later in the opinion, he explained that the precedent confirms "sovereign
immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the struc-
ture of the Constitution itself" 84 and "the scope of the States' immunity
from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by
fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design."8 5 In a
lengthy opinion, Justice Kennedy relied on text, original understanding,
practice, and precedent to support his structural argument and ultimately
set forth a free-standing structural argument emphasizing the myriad
ways in which the removal of sovereign immunity would undermine state
sovereignty. 86 Much of Justice Souter's lengthy dissent seems to be based
on the proposition that there must be some independent source for the
Court's structural argument other than structure itself. Near the outset of
his opinion, Justice Souter contended that the Court was apparently bas-
ing its reasoning on natural law rather than common law.87 Justice Ken-
nedy, in turn, took sharp issue with such a charge, suggesting that Justice
Souter's argument is the result of "analytical confusion or rhetorical de-
vice."'8 8 Nevertheless, Justice Souter devoted much of his opinion to a
thorough and interesting attempt to demonstrate that neither the original
understanding nor the precedent supports a natural law justification for
state sovereign immunity incapable of abrogation. This seems to be
largely beside the point. A structural argument such as the one Justice
Kennedy made need not be derived from some source independent of
constitutional structure such as original understanding, precedent, or nat-
ural law as Justice Souter seemed to assume. Rather, it is a valid constitu-
tional argument capable of standing on its own two feet. It may be a
more persuasive argument if confirmed or supported by other methodol-
ogies such as text, precedent, and original understanding as Justice Ken-
nedy tried to do; or it may be a weaker argument if undermined by these
sources, however, it is not ultimately dependent on them for its validity.
83. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
84. Id. at 728.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 748-53.
87. Id. at 763.
88. Id. at 734.
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B. How DOES THE COURT CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING
STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS?
Beyond the question of where structural arguments come from is the
issue of how the Court determines whether a structural argument is cor-
rect. After contending at great length that there is no support for a con-
ception of sovereign immunity based on natural law, Justice Souter did
concede that the Court had presented an independent structural argu-
ment.89 He challenged that argument directly by presenting his own com-
peting structural argument. 90 In a nutshell, Justice Kennedy argued that
the text of the Constitution, especially in historical context, shows that
states continue to possess significant attributes of sovereignty that are in-
consistent with being subjected to suit absent consent.91 Justice Kennedy
explained that by subjecting states to suit in their own courts, Congress
would violate this residual sovereignty by showing a lack of respect for
the states, threatening their financial integrity, and commandeering their
judicial system, hence the allocation of state governmental priorities and
blurring the lines of political accountability. 92 For Justice Kennedy con-
stitutional structure contains the "unique insight that freedom is en-
hanced by the creation of two governments not one."'93
Justice Souter responded by presenting a very different conception of
constitutional structure. For Justice Souter, the Court's conception of
state sovereignty is deeply flawed in that it is reminiscent of royal prerog-
ative rather than a republican government. 94 Rather, the federal struc-
ture assumed that each government is sovereign with respect to its own
objects and matters of national law are the object of and within the power
of the federal government. 95 Hence, it is not constitutionally inappropri-
ate for Congress to require state courts to enforce federal law. Justice
Kennedy might well agree with Justice Souter's structural proposition
that each government is sovereign over its own object but simply disagree
as to what the appropriate objects are in this case. Just as Justice Souter
argued that the federal government is sovereign with respect to national
matters as expressed through national law, Justice Kennedy would likely
respond that the state government is sovereign with respect to the opera-
tion of its judicial system and, as such, should not be required to entertain
suits to which it has not consented.
Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter each set forth compelling argu-
ments based on constitutional structure. Each conception leads to a dif-
ferent result. They are engaged in the oldest, most fundamental, and
arguably, most intractable argument in American constitutional law-
what is the proper relationship between the federal government and the
89. Id. at 798.
90. Id. at 796-803.
91. Id. at 728.
92. Id. at 748-53.
93. Id. at 758.
94. Id. 801-03.
95. Id. at 798-99.
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States. Justice Souter invoked a nationalistic conception of federal struc-
ture under which the federal government may trump states rights or im-
munities whenever it is within its constitutionally-authorized domain.
This is a conception championed by Hamilton 96 and Marshall,
97 sup-
ported by the passage of the Civil War Amendments and brought into full
bloom by the constitutional revolution of 1937 and consequent judicial
deference. Justice Kennedy described a constitutional structure in which
state sovereignty retains inviolable protection against federal intrusion, at
least in certain specific instances. This vision is more consistent with some
of the views of Jefferson 98 and to a lesser extent Madison;99 one which
has been influential through much of our constitutional history, lost sig-
nificant ground in the mid-Twentieth century, but regained some momen-
tum with the "New Federalism" of the past three decades.' 00
The question is: who is correct, and how can we tell? The answer is,
both are correct, at least in the abstract. Each conception of federal
structure has a textual, theoretical, and historical pedigree and finds sig-
nificant support in practice and precedent. Both make sense. If Justice
Souter's conception is given complete free reign, especially in view of the
enormous expansion of federal power over the past two centuries, there
will be little, if anything, left of state sovereignty. If Justice Kennedy's
conception is taken to the extreme, the States will be able to effectively
block significant national objectives. Neither vision is completely accept-
able. Both are essential. That means that in a specific situation, as this
one, a choice must be made though it need not and should not be a global
rejection of the other alternative.
That leads back to the prior discussion of structural argument and
other interpretive methodologies. In a specific case in which two compet-
ing structural visions, each with a solid pedigree, lead to opposite conclu-
sions, the preferable alternative is probably the one best supported by
other accepted methods of interpretation. a01 Much of the opinions of
both Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter seem intended to try to convince
the reader that its vision is most consistent with text, original understand-
ing, precedent, and practice. Justice Kennedy was able to convince four
other members of the Court and therefore carried the day. I tend to
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-22, 23-26, 59-62, 65-85 (Alexander
Hamilton).
97. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 410.
98. See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolution of 1798 and 1799 reprinted in 4
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540 (2ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1901). See generally
H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of '98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV.
689 (1994) (an insightful discussion of the long-term constitutional significance of the Ken-
tucky and Virginia Resolutions).
99. See James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in ELLIOT, supra note
98, at 528. But Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Printz, 521
U.S. 898 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
101. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, A Constructive Coherence Theory of Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
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agree that his arguments are more persuasive, especially the support he
draws from original understanding. Justice Souter's arguments, though
formidable, convinced only three other justices, but probably have
greater support in the academic community. Like baseball, the federal-
ism debate is never over; there is always next year. The structural visions
set forth by Justices Kennedy and Souter have been debated in judicial
and other forums for over two hundred years. And there is every reason
to believe that the debate is only just beginning.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have made no attempt to discuss and evaluate the full arguments
presented by the majorities and dissents in Seminole and Alden. Rather,
I have tried to focus on several interesting, discrete interpretive issues
raised by these cases. In so doing, I hope to have revealed the intricacy
and complexity of legal argumentation as well as the degree to which
constitutional interpretation so often requires hard choices between legit-
imate, well-developed, and highly-persuasive arguments and counter ar-
guments leading to opposite conclusions. Accepted methodologies of
interpretation provide us with the tools to assess and evaluate these argu-
ments but, in the end, the hard choice is inevitably ours.
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